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Abstract—The continuously increasing diffusion of mobile devices 
such as laptops, PDAs and smartphones, all equipped with 
enhanced functionalities, has led to numerous studies about 
mobility and to the definition of new network architectures 
capable to support it. 
Problems related to mobility have been addressed mostly 
operating on the network or transport layers of the Internet 
protocol stack. As a result, most of these solutions generally 
require modifying the TCP and/or the IP protocol. Although this 
approach is well suited to handle mobility, it lacks in 
compatibility with the Internet Protocol Suite. 
This consideration led us to study a fully TCP compatible and 
flexible approach we dubbed MOON, for MObile Overlay 
Network. This network architecture is currently under design at 
LIPAR, the Internet, Protocols and Network Architecture Lab of 
Politecnico di Torino. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The standard Internet architecture was not thought with 
mobility in mind. It just provides for a point to point 
communication between two fixed end points and routing is 
simply based on fixed IP addresses. However, in a mobility 
environment, the point of attachment to the network of the 
moving end point may change, requiring a variation of its IP 
address. In turns, the IP address change makes a moving end 
point unreachable when using TCP/UDP. 
This is summarized in this simple observation [1]: 
“The fundamental problem is that the Internet uses IP 
addresses to combine the notion of unique host identifier with 
location in the network topology”. 
Over the years, several proposals have been made to 
overcome these limitations [2],[3],[4],[5]. Some of them 
operate on the network layer while others focus on upper layers 
such as transport or application. Unfortunately, all these 
approaches present several shortcomings as described in [1]. 
In order to overcome these problems, we started studying a 
new network architecture, we named MObile Overlay Network 
or MOON, which supports mobility in a multi-domain 
environment, operates at the session layer and is fully 
compliant with the Internet Protocol Stack. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we 
precisely define what mobility is and we specify the goals of 
MOON. Section III describes the architectural model used. 
Section IV illustrates our solution while in Section V the 
security in MOON is analyzed. Section VI presents a proposal 
of integration of authentication and mobility services. Finally 
Section VII summarizes the paper. 
II. MOBILITY 
Mobility is a broad and sometimes confusing term. Hence, 
it is very important to give a precise definition of what mobility 
really is and to distinguish all its possible forms. 
The first point is to distinguish mobility from portability. 
We refer to portability as the possibility for a user to access to 
information and network resources wherever he is. This implies 
that when a user moves to a new location, he is still able to 
obtain the same services he had in the previous location, but all 
the established connections are torn down during the movement 
from the old location to the new one. 
Mobility overcomes the limitations of portability and allows 
the user to gain immediate access to the network after the 
movement has been completed. Mobility should also keep all 
the previously established connections active. 
We can identify several types of mobility. 
Host (or terminal) Mobility: it refers to the function of 
allowing a mobile node to change its point of attachment to the 
network, without interrupting IP packet delivery to, or from, 
that node. Accurate location and routing procedures are 
required in order to maintain the integrity of the communication 
[6]. 
Network Mobility: refers to the function of allowing an 
entire subnetwork to change its point of attachment to the 
network without interrupting IP packet delivery to, or from, that 
mobile subnetwork [6].  
Personal Mobility: rather than on devices, this type of 
mobility focuses users and their movements. In the case of 
Personal Mobility, research has focused on two aspects, both of 
which operate at or above the network layer in the OSI 
reference model. The first addresses the issues associated with 
enabling a user to be contacted by another user, regardless of 
his location and the device he is using (contactability). The 
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second addresses the issues associated with personalizing a 
user's operating environment regardless of the terminal or 
network he is using (personalization) [7].  
Session Mobility: Session Mobility tracks communication 
sessions as they move, either coincident with one of the above 
forms of mobility or not. 
Obviously, mobility is more useful than portability but it 
raises many new problems. The first one is the management of 
mobility. When a user moves, the point of attachment to the 
network of its mobile device may change but, in any case, he 
should be reachable even in this new location. Unfortunately, it 
can happen that, due to the change in the attachment point, the 
mobile station gets a new IP address. However, if the IP 
address is changed, any established TCP connection is 
immediately shut down, since TCP addresses are composed of 
a port number, that has not been changed, and of the IP host 
address, that has been changed. 
A network architecture aiming to support mobility must 
introduce some mechanisms to deal with this undesired 
behavior of TCP. 
A second problem is represented by the access control. 
Wireless networks generally have a limited bandwidth with 
respect to wired networks and therefore limiting the access only 
to authorized users, and controlling the traffic they inject in the 
network, becomes an important aspect. 
Moreover, security is a crucial issue to be considered in a 
wireless environment. Before verifying what are the resources a 
user can access to (i.e. performing the access control), the user 
must be authenticated. Performing an authentication, however, 
might require a long time. Even though the need of 
authentication mechanisms is not limited to wireless networks, 
it is more problematic for these environments than it is for 
wired ones. The reasons are multiple. First of all, the 
interruption of the connectivity due to the time required for 
authenticating a user could trigger the termination of TCP 
connections. If this happens, the network is no more able to 
support mobility. Moreover, in wireless networks, 
authentication is expected to be performed more frequently than 
in wired ones due to security concerns related to the broadcast 
nature of the wireless medium. Examples of this are 802.11 
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) where authentication 
is required whenever the mobile device associates to a new 
Access Point. In particular environments with specific security 
constraints and where encryption is used, authentication might 
be also periodically carried out in order to create new 
encryption keys. 
Summarizing, authentication mechanisms and mobility 
management operations affect the total handoff latency. This is 
a strong limitation for real-time interactive (multimedia) 
applications, such as (video)telephony and (video)conference or 
whenever tight time constraints are required. 
The last problems related to mobility are accounting and 
billing. In some environments, indeed, wireless access could 
not be free; therefore mechanisms to keep track of user 
movements are needed to be able to charge him. 
Mobility embraces a wide range of technologies and mobile 
devices, but in the remainder of this paper we will essentially 
focus on 802.11 WLANs. 
More precisely, the wireless environment we will consider 
is based on an 802.1X [8] compliant infrastructure for 
authentication and on MOON for mobility support. We recall 
that 802.1X is a port based authentication protocol requiring a 
user to authenticate to get access to the network.  
The goal of MOON is to identify a network architecture 
with the following properties: 
preservation of communications: all the previously 
established TCP connections must be preserved during 
handoffs, and in general a change in the point of attachment to 
the network must not affect any type of communication among 
peers. 
higher layers independence from lower layers: current 
implementation of the Internet protocol stack introduces a 
dependence of higher layers (e.g. application layer) from lower 
layers (e.g. IP, TCP). Indeed, most of the Internet applications 
use lower layers identifiers (e.g. IP addresses and TCP ports) as 
unique network identifiers or titles, since they usually don’t 
change during a communication session. This is an obstacle for 
mobility support. To eliminate this dependence, lower layer 
protocols should be fully transparent to applications. In this 
way, handoffs among network attachment points using both 
identical (e.g. from Wi-Fi to Wi-Fi) and different (e.g. from 
Wi-Fi to UMTS) technologies have no impact on mobility. This 
means that they can be treated in the same, or at the least in a 
very similar manner.  
efficient routing: the performance of routing in MOON 
should be comparable with the one obtained in IP routing. 
efficient handoff: handoff management should be optimized 
in order to reduce, or avoid if possible, packet loss. Moreover, 
other factors (e.g. the available bandwidth) than signal strength 
must be used to find out when and to which access point to 
perform a handoff. 
simultaneous mobility: a mobile architecture should be able 
to handle simultaneous mobility of communicating peers. 
flexibility: all types of mobility should be supported. 
quality of service: the architecture should be able to support 
QoS provided that an underlying communication infrastructure 
able to provide QoS is available. 
security: it comprises several aspects. First of all, only 
authorized users can access to network resources. Furthermore, 
in order to guarantee privacy on the air communication, 
encryption mechanisms must be used. Other operations such as 
accounting and billing require network security as well. Finally, 
all the procedures regulating the overlay network behavior 
should be protected by possible attacks. 
The basic idea behind this new architecture is to put more 
intelligence inside the network, despite the Internet traditional 
approach where complex operations are performed by end 
points. By acting in this fashion, it is possible to provide 
mobility, along with other services, as a network service. This 
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also increases the security level of the network limiting the role 
of the Mobile Host (MH) in the service provision. 
III. ARCHITECTURAL MODEL 
Large scale deployment of Wireless Local Area Networks 
(WLANs), first inside enterprises and then in public areas, 
arose a lot of problems. They include management, monitoring 
and control of a large number of access devices or Access 
Points (APs). We can simply consider the problem of 
distributing and maintaining a consistent configuration of all 
the APs in a WLAN, or the dynamic update of wireless 
medium parameters in each AP to optimize the wireless 
medium usage, to understand the size and the complexity of 
this task. Securing the access to the network and preventing the 
installation of unauthorized APs are a further aspect to be 
considered. All of these issues could be treated in an easier way 
using a centralized approach. For the aforementioned reasons 
we choose as the architectural model for MOON the 
Centralized WLAN Architecture [11]. 
The main concept behind the Centralized WLAN 
architecture is the possibility to clearly distinguish between 
logical WLAN access network functions and individual 
physical devices, taking advantage of the flexibility of the 
802.11 architecture. 
Indeed, including 802.11 functions and services in a single 
device (i.e. the AP) is rather a vendor choice than a requirement 
of the standard. In a centralized WLAN architecture, instead, 
AP functionalities can be split between two components: the 
Wireless Termination Point (WTP) and the Access Controller 
(AC). Moreover, different types of centralized WLAN 
architectures are possible, according to the 802.11 MAC 
functions implemented in WTPs and ACs, respectively. Finally, 
WTPs and ACs can be interconnected in several fashions: for 
the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, in the rest 
of this paper we will only consider direct connections between 
a WTP and an AC. 
From a security point of view, a centralized architecture 
significantly simplifies the management of the authentication. 
Moving the 802.1x authenticator functionality from a set of 
APs to a single AC allows grouping several WTPs (i.e. APs 
without authentication functionalities) in a single logical entity, 
so that all handoffs among them are simpler and faster. 
Moreover, unlike APs, ACs can be placed in a physically 
secure environment (a cabinet or a locked room) thus 
increasing the security level of the whole network.  
It is important to observe that the point where MAC 
functionalities are implemented affects the way mobile client or 
supplicant and authenticator communicate. Indeed, if the WTP 
just implements the physical layer, it does not have a MAC 
address and the MAC advertised in beacons is the one of the 
AC (i.e. the authenticator). In this simple case, the supplicant 
can directly retrieve the authenticator MAC address from 
beacons, as it is currently done in Wi-Fi networks. This is not 
possible if the WTP has its own MAC address and a method to 
discover the authenticator MAC address must be found. An 
effective solution to this problem is to address the authenticator 
using the Port Access Entity (PAE) group address as specified 
in [8]. 
In the reminder of this paper, we will consider the most 
common scenario, where WTPs still maintain their MAC 
functionalities. 
IV. THE MOON ARCHITECTURE 
The hierarchical structure we propose for MOON is quite 
similar to the architecture of cellular networks and is shown in 
Figure 1. In MOON there are two routing entities: 
Enhanced Gateway Router (EGR): it is the highest 
hierarchical entity in the overlay network. It is located at the 
border of an administrative domain and connects this 
administrative domain to the Internet. 
Enhanced Access Router (EAR): it is an edge router with 
enhanced authentication and location functionalities. EARs are 
the entry points to the overlay network. They can be viewed as 
a sort of enhanced AC and, therefore, also have an active role 
(e.g. the authenticator) in authentication, according to the 
Centralized WLAN architecture paradigm. They are at the 
lower layer of the hierarchy. 
EARs behave as the Mobile Switching Centers (MSC) of a 
GSM cellular network, whereas an EGR is similar to a Gateway 
MSC: to provide QoS and mobility for the communicating 
peers all IP packets are encapsulated and transferred thru virtual 
circuits in MOON. 
To see how this happens let now examine what is inside a 
Mobile Host (MH): a session layer handler is used to manage 
inbound and outbound traffic and to control handoffs. All the 
packets sent from the host applications are encapsulated by the 
handler and delivered to the destination via the overlay network 
without breaking the end-to-end semantic of the connection. 
For native applications, new session layer sockets can be 
defined. However, support for legacy applications, although 
more problematic, can be provided as well. For this purpose, in 
order to masquerade IP address modifications due to the change 
of the point of attachment to the network caused by a mobility 
event, a virtual interface is defined. The IP address of this 
interface is fixed and does not change during any handoff. All 
the applications refer to this interface regardless of the real 
interface used to communicate. In this way, the applications 
become unaware of mobility. Finally, thanks to the session 
handler, it is possible to perform either horizontal handoffs (i.e. 
handoffs using the same real interface) or vertical handoffs (i.e. 
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Figure 1 MOON Architecture Overview 
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handoffs using two different real interfaces, such as Wi-Fi and 
UMTS). 
Hosts are the leaves of the MOON hierarchy (clients of the 
overlay network) and each MH is connected directly (in case of 
wired connections) or via a WTP (in case of wireless 
connections) to a single EAR. 
In turns, EARs are logically grouped and interconnected 
with a meshed network. Each group refers to a single EGR. The 
switching nodes of the overlay network (i.e. EARs and EGRs) 
are coincident to the switching points of the underlying network 
in order to have a delivery path equal to the path defined by IP 
routing (efficient routing). 
Moreover, being the overlay nodes coincident with the 
switching points of the “real” network no new points of failure 
are added. 
To guarantee data delivery to the destination end point a 
new session layer address space is defined. A session address 
is structured in such a way that end point location and its 
globally unique identifier are separated, avoiding the well 
known problems of IP address used in a mobile environment. It 
is important to notice that a session between two end points is 
defined only by the identifier part of this address which does 
never change during handoffs. In such a way, simultaneous 
mobility can be treated as well as the case where there is only 
one end point in movement.  
The session address for a given end point can be resolved 
using a DNS-like mechanism. The basic idea is to use a logical 
and unique name for end points. In particular, we adopted the 
following NAI [12] convention: user@domain. Subsequently, 
this logical name is resolved in a session address. Basing on the 
location information contained in this address, a hierarchic 
routing is performed inside the overlay network. Obviously, the 
location part of the session address changes whenever the end 
point moves.  
The entity which is in charge of name resolution is called 
location register (LR), which stores the logical name-session 
address mapping. Two operations are therefore needed to 
guarantee effective packet delivery after mobility: to update the 
session address (of the moving end point) contained in the 
location register and to redirect packets from the old EAR to 
the new one on the fly, using a proper signaling mechanism. 
LR updating is needed in order to assure end point 
reachability for future sessions. Redirection, instead, is 
performed in order to keep all the connections alive during the 
handoff and reduce packet loss. 
Indeed, the sending end point is not aware of the movement 
of the other peer until it does not receive packets from it 
notifying the new session address. It simply keeps sending to 
the old location. Using the redirection, these packets are not lost 
but forwarded to the new end point location. The redirection 
ends when the new session address is learned by the other end 
point involved in the communication. It is worth mentioning 
that the signaling protocol to be used could involve not only 
EARs but also EGRs if domain boundaries are crossed.  
In conclusion, with respect to the most employed solution 
for mobility management, that is Mobile IPv4 [5], MOON 
presents several advantages: first of all, MOON operates at the 
session layer of the OSI reference model, thus avoiding all the 
problems related to the network layer, which are basically due 
to the double meaning of IP addresses (host identification and 
route identification). 
The Mobile IP addresses this issue by forcing the MH to 
always use two IP addresses: a fixed home address and a care-
of address changing at each new point of attachment. Thanks to 
the fixed address the MH may keep all its TCP connections 
alive even after a change in the point of attachment. For this to 
be achieved, a previous registration of the care-of address to the 
MH’s home agent is necessary. In this way, all the packets 
directed to the MH are captured by the home agent and then 
forwarded to its current location. On the contrary, datagrams 
sent by the MH are, in most cases, directly delivered to their 
destination. This operation is known in literature as triangle 
routing. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that Mobile IPv4 
could encounter some problems when ingress filtering is used 
inside the foreign network as security policy.  
In MOON all the packets directed to a mobile host do not 
require to be addressed to its home network but are directly sent 
to the target instead. As a result the routing is more efficient. 
Finally, the use of a session layer address allows to 
overcome the limitations of interconnecting hosts which belong 
to heterogeneous Internet address spaces (e.g. IPv4 and IPv6 
public and private addresses).  
Furthermore, the hierarchical structure of MOON makes it 
easier to manage and improves any pre-existent QoS 
mechanisms in the underlying network. MPLS solutions based 
on label switching are particularly suitable in this context. 
V. SECURITY 
So far we have presented the MOON principles. In this 
section we illustrate how the security problem is addressed in 
our proposed network architecture. 
The most recent solution for security in wireless network is 
the IEEE standard 802.11i [13]. It basically relies on the 802.1x 
Port Based Authentication and uses the authentication messages 
exchanged between supplicant and authentication server (AS) 
via the authenticator to establish the keys required to secure on 
the air communications. All these keys are hierarchically 
related as follows: 
• MK: the Master Key is at the top of the key hierarchy. 
It is a key shared between the AS (RADIUS server) and 
the supplicant (MH). It is also called the AAA key. 
• PMK: the Pairwise Master Key is usually derived from 
the MK by both the supplicant and the AS. This key 
bonds the supplicant and the authenticator, and can also 
be directly obtained from a pre-shared key. 
• PTK: the Pairwise Transient Key is directly derived 
from the PMK by the supplicant (MH) and the 
authenticator (AP). Actually, the PTK is a collection of 
three operational keys: the Key Confirmation Key 
(KCK), used to prove possession of the PMK, the Key 
Encryption Key (KEK), used to distribute the Group 
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Transient Key (GTK), and the Temporal Key (TK) used 
to secure the data traffic. 
• GTK: the Group Transient Key is used to secure 
multicast or broadcast data traffic. 
 
Full 802.11i authentication requires a lot of messages 
between supplicant, authenticator and AS. In order to mitigate 
this, 802.11i itself proposes a method (based on pre-
authentication [13]) to speed up subsequent authentications on 
APs belonging to the same network of the first AP the MH 
authenticated to. However, pre-authentication can not cross 
subnet boundaries, limiting in this way the effectiveness of this 
method. Another solution presented by researchers of 
University of Maryland introduces the Pro-Active Key 
Distribution (PAKD) [15] to overcome this problem. The main 
idea is to pre-distribute the key material to those APs towards 
which the MH is likely to roam, regardless the subnet 
organization. The set of APs concerned in the pre-distribution is 
determined by means of Neighbor Graphs, a data structure 
containing, for each AP, an adjacency list (i.e. a list of all its 
neighbors). Nevertheless, PAKD does not take into account the 
possibility of a multi-domain environment. 
To overcome this limitation, we choose, as authentication 
mechanism, the fast authentication procedures described in [14] 
(FAIWL). The reasons which lead us to make this decision are 
the following: 
• it relies on 802.11i, the new IEEE standard  for wireless 
security; 
• it reduces the handoff latency caused by the 
authentication providing fast authentication 
mechanisms; 
• it is thought for multi-domain environments; 
• it fits the requirements of multimedia and interactive 
applications. 
A short description of FAIWL will be provided in the 
following of this section. 
A. FAIWL Overview 
FAIWL aims to improve PAKD leveraging on a centralized 
WLAN architecture resulting in a more flexible, scalable and 
secure authentication mechanism. 
The introduction of a centralized hierarchy modifies the 
structure of neighbor graphs, which now store a list of adjacent 
EARs (i.e. a group of WTPs), and the authentication process. In 
order to describe it, a MH and two domains are considered: the 
MH Home Network (HN) and a generic Foreign Network (FN). 
Moreover, a previously established roaming agreement 
between these two domains is assumed. At the beginning the 
MH is off and is in a location covered by FN. 
When the MH is switched on, it must fully authenticate 
himself in order to gain access to the FN. This phase, which is 
basically the same as the 802.11i standard authentication, is 
crucial because during it the keys on which the fast 
authentication is based are created and distributed. 
At the end of the authentication process, an authentication 
context for the specific MH is created. The authentication 
context of a MH is defined as the set of MK, PMK, user 
identity and MH MAC address. If, like in this case, the MH is 
not in its HN, this information is stored in the remote RADIUS 
server and then transmitted to the local AS. In this way, the FN 
is from now on able to treat the MH as a local host. Obviously, 
due to the importance of these data, the communication channel 
between the pair of RADIUS servers must be secure. Then the 
local RADIUS server is able to create the PMKs for the 
neighbors of the EAR currently hosting the MH, and to 
distribute them according to the PAKD procedure. 
A full authentication is not always needed and is not the 
most suitable choice in some handoff scenarios. In order to 
understand what kind of authentication must be carried out, it is 
necessary to identify all the possible movements that a MH can 
do. This analysis leads to three different scenarios, which are: 
• intra EAR movement, 
• inter EAR intra domain movement, 
• inter EAR inter domain movement. 
In the following these three types of movement are briefly 
explained. 
1) Intra EAR Movement 
An intra EAR movement happens whenever a MH 
disassociates from a WTP and then associates to another WTP 
controlled by the same EAR. We refer to this kind of mobility 
as nano-mobility or n-mobility: it is expected to take place more 
frequently than other types of mobility which usually involve 
longer range movements.  
Due to the likely high frequency of an n-mobility event, the 
authentication mechanism should be able to handle it as fast as 
possible. The solution proposed by FAIWL is the Zero 
Authentication. An example of the Zero Authentication 
conversation between a MH and an EAR is represented in 
Figure 3. 
It consists of a challenge through which the MH 
demonstrates the possession of the right key material. In terms 
of elapsed time, we can observe that the Zero Authentication 
scheme only requires two local (i.e. between the EAR and the 
MH) round trip times against the long message flow of the full 
authentication. 
2) Inter EAR Intra Domain Movement 
An inter EAR intra domain movement happens whenever 
the MH handoffs between WTPs controlled by different EARs: 
we refer this case as micro-mobility or µ-mobility.  
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Thanks to the pro-active key distribution, before the MH 
performs the handoff, the adjacent EARs already have a PMK 
to share with the MH. 
When the EAR receives a request of authentication it 
checks the PMK for this MH. If it finds out that there is a 
correct PTK available, the Fast Authentication is started 
otherwise a full authentication is performed. Fast 
Authentication consists in the 802.11i four way handshake with 
two additional messages1 (i.e. EAPOL-Start and EAP-Success) 
used to learn the authenticator (EAR) MAC address.  
Finally, Fast Authentication does not require any interaction 
with the authentication (RADIUS) server, as it would be for a 
full authentication, and thus reduces the time required to 
perform the handoff. In the worst case (when the two additional 
messages are used), performing a Fast Authentication only 
takes three local round trip times and does not add any 
particular mechanism to the key management of 802.11i, 
making this mechanism easy to implement. The Fast 
Authentication message exchange is shown in Figure 2. 
3) Inter EAR Inter Domain Movement 
This scenario is the most complex, since the MH leaves a 
domain and enters a new one. This kind of mobility is referred 
to as macro-mobility or M-mobility. 
In general, whenever the administrative domain is changed 
a full authentication is expected to be required. However, it is 
possible to distinguish three different cases, according to the 
different agreements among domains: 
• no agreement, 
• roaming agreement, 
• trust relationship. 
In the first case, the MH has no network access after the 
                                                           
1 Actually, these two messages are not needed if MAC functionalities are not 
implemented in the WTPs.  
handoff, since no authentication can be performed. 
If a roaming agreement exists, the MH can access the 
network after having fully authenticated himself to the new 
domain. 
In the latter case, the MH can enter the new domain 
executing a Fast Authentication. 
Before analyzing how Fast Authentication can be extended 
to a multi-domain environment, it is worth clarifying what is a 
trust relationship among domains. Trust relationship is defined 
as a particular roaming agreement where the authentication 
(RADIUS) servers of the parties involved can accept 
authentication context information without requiring the MH to 
fully authenticate himself to its home network: in a roaming 
agreement, the authentication context is transmitted to the local 
AS by the home network AS only after a successful full 
authentication; in a trust relationship the local AS directly 
receives the context from the AS of the domain from which the 
MH is coming. This server can either be the home AS (the MH 
was originally in its home network) or any other AS (the MH 
was already roaming in another network). 
In order to manage the trust relationships among domains a 
new data structure called list of trust is introduced. This list, 
stored in the RADIUS server, contains all the trusted domains 
by the local domain. 
Supplicant
(MH)
Authenticator
(EAR)
PMK is known
Generate SNonce
Derive PTK
Derive PTK
EAPOL−Key(Install PTK, Unicast, MIC)
Install PTK Install PTK
802.1X Controlled Port
Unblocked
Generate ANonce
EAPOL−Key(ANonce, Unicast)
EAPOL−Key(SNonce, Unicast, MIC)
EAPOL−Key(Unicast, MIC)
PMK is known
EAPOL−Start
EAP−Success
 
Figure 2 Fast Authentication message flow 
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Figure 3 Zero Authentication message flow 
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If MH is in its home network and is preparing to roam 
towards an adjacent network, the context transfer is decided on 
the base of the HN list of trust, in case customized for the 
specific MH. More generally, a context transfer should be done 
only towards a subset of domains present in the list of trust, i.e. 
the ones enabled by the HN for this MH. Therefore, if MH is in 
a foreign network, having a local list of trust is not yet 
sufficient to decide whether the context of a MH is to be 
transmitted or not.  
Let us consider the case where the MH is in a foreign 
network FN1 and it is going to move to a WTP of a different 
foreign network FN2. If there is not a trust relationship between 
the HN and the FN2 the context of MH should not be 
transferred to this network even though a trust exists between 
FN1 and FN2. To solve this problem,  an additional inter-
RADIUS communication is proposed. When the MH enters the 
FN1, this network advertises the HN for all its trusted 
neighbors. The HN in turns replies selecting the authorized 
domains for the related MH. For evident reasons such 
communication takes always place between the current network 
and the home network. Summarizing, the context of a MH 
belonging to a different network can be transferred to a third 
party only if both HN and FN1 trust it. 
Finally, it is important to point out that, using the proposed 
method, MHs belonging to the same network can have different 
sets of trusted domains. Furthermore, every change made in the 
list of trust is managed locally and need not be transmitted to 
other domains.   
VI. INTEGRATING MOON AND FAIWL 
In previous sections we have presented, separately, two 
mechanisms to manage mobility and security, respectively. The 
further step is to integrate these two elements in order to have a 
unique solution able to provide both mobility and 
authentication as network services. Moreover, this integration 
could avoid redundancy, decreasing the number of messages 
needed. 
For this to be achieved, we propose to add to the 
authentication context further information useful for mobility 
such as the previous session address of the MH. 
This information can be used, in case of roaming, by the 
new EAR in order to retrieve all data related to previous 
connections by the old EAR. In this way it is possible to 
redirect old sessions to the new EAR without requiring a direct 
MH interaction. Furthermore, authentication can be used as 
well to track MH in its movements. Indeed, whenever the MH 
moves to a new location it has to authenticate itself to gain 
access to the network. If the authentication successfully ends, 
the EAR can somehow advertise the location register of the MH 
of its new position. Again, the MH does not take active part in 
this operation. 
Location updating and MH tracking are two examples of 
integration between mobility and authentication. More 
precisely, mobility can take advantage of the functionalities 
provided by the authentication service in order to perform 
secure and faster handoff. 
The idea is to define a hierarchy among network services in 
order to allow a useful integration and cooperation among 
different functionalities belonging to specific network services. 
Integration is probably the most innovative point introduced by 
MOON. The advantages brought by this approach with respect 
to traditional solutions based on Mobile IPv4 are particularly 
clear when we consider the authentication of the network users 
which is mandatory for any wireless environment due to the 
nature of the physical medium. Several operations, such as the 
registration to a mobile agent, the location updating or the 
mobile host tracking are now implicitly handled by the network 
(and not by the mobile host) by simply elaborating the 
information obtained during the authentication phase. As a 
consequence the time required to re-connect to the network 
should be considerably shorter. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented a new overlay network 
architecture called MOON which handles mobility and is fully 
compliant with the Internet Protocol Suite. We also described 
FAIWL, the security mechanism used in MOON. Finally, a 
proposal of integration of authentication and mobility services 
has been made in order to reduce time and messages required to 
perform a handoff. 
This research activity is going on and we are currently 
analyzing and specifiyng the signaling protocols to be used in 
MOON, as well as the operations to be performed by its 
elements. 
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